WORKING PAPERS
Current versions of some of the following papers are available as a PDF or hard copy. If interested, please contact me.
"Self-Protection Against Crime Victimization: Theory and Evidence from University Campuses"
Abstract. Although economists have
long studied self-protection behavior, researchers have not extensively
investigated how people simultaneously engage in self-protection alongside
routine activities such as recreation and market work—the behaviors that expose
individuals to the risk of crime victimization in the first place. This paper
addresses three essential questions along these lines: How does self-protection
coexist with social activity and work activity? What factors influence the
selection of the three activities? What resources do people draw upon in this
process? I apply the classic state-preference theoretical approach to these
questions, modelling the activities as choice variables and emphasizing how
different types of resources may become relevant in their selection. The
analysis suggests patterns by which the endogenous outcomes might be jointly
determined and allows derivation of comparative-static relationships that
function as testable hypotheses. For empirical investigation, I use a unique
data set containing detailed information about the self-protective,
recreational, and employment practices of over 3,000 U.S. university students.
Three-stage least squares models facilitate econometric analysis of these
behaviors as systems of simultaneous equations. The results widely conform to
predictions and show how individuals selectively use social and personal
resources when protecting themselves against crime as they go about work, play,
and schooling.
"The Demand for Younger and Older Workers: Patterns from NFL Labor Markets"
Abstract. Potential workers enter the labor market with genuine promises of productivity, but they also carry risk factors. Their talent and physical productivity might ultimtely fall short of employers’ expectations or requirements. Workers might also develop health problems, show sketchy commitment to the work or the job, or even encounter legal troubles—all of which threaten their productivity independent of any talent shortfalls. These risk factors complicate matters further when employers look for the right balance of younger and older workers, as all employers must do. How do productivity and risk factors affect the demand for workers in different age categories? I address this question theoretically in this paper by developing a labor demand model of the decision to hire younger and older workers. Two primary NFL labor markets for players—the NFL draft process and the veteran free agent market—present valuable empirical environments for testing hypotheses emanating from the model. NFL employers (clubs) demonstrate greater demand for rookies by drafting them earlier and greater demand for veterans by signing them faster, once the free agent market opens. Overall, NFL clubs appear to draft and sign players in patterns consistent with predictions from the theoretical model. Furthermore, while greater physical productivity enhances labor demand for all players, different risk factors affect the demand for younger and older players differently. Most importantly along these lines, individual worker risk factors appear to exert a more serious labor market penalty for veterans, a pattern supported by theory and much in line with previous economic research on the demand for risky workers and the demand for older workers.
"Performance, Expectations, and Managerial Dismissal: Evidence from the National Football League" (with Clint Chadwick)
Abstract. Researchers in many disciplines have shown that lower overall firm performance motivates the termination of top managers. But many have also suggested that managerial dismissal stems particularly from shortfalls of performance relative to expectations, whether in relation to corporate executives or the managers of professional sports teams. But relatively few have investigated the role of expectations empirically, owing to difficulties in measuring them. In this paper we address this question theoretically by framing the interaction of performance, expectations, and the use (and potential dismissal) of managers as a labor demand problem, using applied microeconomic tools to demonstrate how variation in expectations and performance can alter how a National Football League organization employs player and coaching talent. Empirically, we take advantage of an institutional change—the NFL’s adoption of a salary cap and free agency in the early 1990s—to isolate an exogenous change in performance expectations. While the salary cap constrained the amount clubs could spend annually on player talent, it placed no constraint on expenditures for managerial (coaching) talent. This may have led clubs to allocate more resources toward coaching talent and consequently place higher expectations on head coaches, resulting in a greater probability of dismissal in the post-cap period. Using data on NFL head coaches from 1979 to 2006 and probit models of turnover, we find that the probability of coach dismissal increased in the post-cap era and that concrete measures of an organization’s player talent, coaching talent, and on-field performance gained importance as determinants of turnover from the pre- to the post-cap era, indicative of increased expectations.